How long do you have to study how to study the Bible to know how to study the Bible? I don’t know, but I know after spending a semester in Hermeneutics, and it was a great experience, I still have no clue what is going on in a passage half the time. Kevin Bywater lead the Summit Oxford group today in a discussion on Matt 16’s sharp passage wherein mild mannered Jesus responds “Get behind me Satan!” The question—Who is Jesus talking to in Matt 16:23? The whole passage is supprising…
The answer to the last question is easy: “But Jesus turned and said to Peter…” He was not talking to Satan. Or was he? That is difficult. Kevin turned our gaze to context, which never helps until someone points it out, and then it is obvious. Ch 16 flitters with the theme of naming—“who do people say that I am?” Jesus asks. In response, Peter makes his great confession of Christ: “You are the Christ the son of the living God.” And how does Jesus respond to this? He gives him a name—Peter, meaning Rock—and he explains the source of Peter’s statement—it is from God, not man. Peter makes a confession, Jesus gives Peter a name and tells the source of Peter’s statement. Does this at all look familiar?
If you are like me, you will answer….No. But it is familiar. What does the “get behind me Satan” sequence look like? Peter rebukes Jesus, and Jesus doesn’t like that, so he gives Peter a name—Satan. Peter is called a stumbling stone (rock), and the source of his rebuke is given—man, and not God.
What is going on here? I am not sure, but certainly something! And I think that is happening far more than we (myself included) realize. I have seen today that my Biblical eyes are not nearly as perceptive as they could and should be, and I am sure many reminders of this truth await me in the future. I hope this has served to sharpen your vision, as I did for me.
Wednesday, September 10, 2008
Monday, September 8, 2008
First Cause Continued: Reasons for Russell
No doubt my case (see previous post) for the cosmological argument is found wanting. And that was my intent, for it was essentially Russell’s critique. But in fairness, those claiming an argument founded on reasons (reasons, say, for the beginning of the universe or for it being caused) must support their claims. Russell deserves a response.
Russell hits on the correct two prongs of the Kalam cosmological argument: whether the universe began, and, if it did, whether that beginning need be caused. Contrary to assertion, I think there is reason to affirm both.
First, there is reason to think that if the universe began, its beginning was caused. To begin, the idea seems intuitive, and we should believe our intuitions if there is no reason to doubt them. The plausibility of this premise is further revealed by considering the absurdity of its negation, the claim that some things could being without a cause. Atheistic philosopher Kai Nielsen gives an illustration: Imagine you and a friend are enjoying a walk in the woods. Suddenly, you both hear a loud ‘BANG!’ You turn to your friend and say “what caused that bang? He replies, “O, nothing.” Such an answer would be utterly dissatisfying. Since it would not make to say that (X) began to exist without cause but was generated/produced/came from (Y), the one who holds that things can begin to exist without cause holds that something can come from nothing. But if there is actually nothing, then there isn’t even the potential for the universe to begin. But how can something be actual without first being possible? Lastly, suppose that things could come into being without cause—why doesn’t anything and everything pop into existence at any time? It would be hard to propose some regulatory truth without positing necessary or sufficient condition, and thereby bordering cause.*
Second, there are reasons to think that the world has not always existed, and there are reasons to suppose it began. One could begin with the evidence of science. Oxford’s Sir Anthony Kenny writes, “A proponent of the big Bang theory, at least if he is an atheist, must believe that the matter of the universe came from nothing and by nothing.” Red Shift, Cosmic Background radiation, and Einstein’s theory of general relativity all offer support to the idea of a universe with a beginning. But, “quite apart from that, which represents the momentary state of science that may change tomorrow,” there are good rational reasons to believe that the universe began. Again, consider the contradictory. If the universe had existed for eternity past, what would that mean of our present existence? It would imply that a span of infinite breadth, the span of all the history prior to the present, had been traversed. It is obvious that one could never count up to infinity—there is simply always another number to count. But why suppose the task is achievable simply by counting down from infinity rather than up to it? Likewise, why think that, in a beginningless universe, one could arrive at the present simply because we count down from infinity past?
More has and could be said on this, thought for now I want to emphasize that there are reasons, or at least potential reason for why the universe began a finite time ago. And anyone who would hold that there need not be a first cause because the universe did not begin must be prepared to explain away the putative reasons to the contrary, and that includes Bertrand Russell.*
*I am clearly dependent on the work of William L. Craig. For more detail on these arguments, see his article, "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe"
Russell hits on the correct two prongs of the Kalam cosmological argument: whether the universe began, and, if it did, whether that beginning need be caused. Contrary to assertion, I think there is reason to affirm both.
First, there is reason to think that if the universe began, its beginning was caused. To begin, the idea seems intuitive, and we should believe our intuitions if there is no reason to doubt them. The plausibility of this premise is further revealed by considering the absurdity of its negation, the claim that some things could being without a cause. Atheistic philosopher Kai Nielsen gives an illustration: Imagine you and a friend are enjoying a walk in the woods. Suddenly, you both hear a loud ‘BANG!’ You turn to your friend and say “what caused that bang? He replies, “O, nothing.” Such an answer would be utterly dissatisfying. Since it would not make to say that (X) began to exist without cause but was generated/produced/came from (Y), the one who holds that things can begin to exist without cause holds that something can come from nothing. But if there is actually nothing, then there isn’t even the potential for the universe to begin. But how can something be actual without first being possible? Lastly, suppose that things could come into being without cause—why doesn’t anything and everything pop into existence at any time? It would be hard to propose some regulatory truth without positing necessary or sufficient condition, and thereby bordering cause.*
Second, there are reasons to think that the world has not always existed, and there are reasons to suppose it began. One could begin with the evidence of science. Oxford’s Sir Anthony Kenny writes, “A proponent of the big Bang theory, at least if he is an atheist, must believe that the matter of the universe came from nothing and by nothing.” Red Shift, Cosmic Background radiation, and Einstein’s theory of general relativity all offer support to the idea of a universe with a beginning. But, “quite apart from that, which represents the momentary state of science that may change tomorrow,” there are good rational reasons to believe that the universe began. Again, consider the contradictory. If the universe had existed for eternity past, what would that mean of our present existence? It would imply that a span of infinite breadth, the span of all the history prior to the present, had been traversed. It is obvious that one could never count up to infinity—there is simply always another number to count. But why suppose the task is achievable simply by counting down from infinity rather than up to it? Likewise, why think that, in a beginningless universe, one could arrive at the present simply because we count down from infinity past?
More has and could be said on this, thought for now I want to emphasize that there are reasons, or at least potential reason for why the universe began a finite time ago. And anyone who would hold that there need not be a first cause because the universe did not begin must be prepared to explain away the putative reasons to the contrary, and that includes Bertrand Russell.*
*I am clearly dependent on the work of William L. Craig. For more detail on these arguments, see his article, "The Existence of God and the Beginning of the Universe"
Sunday, September 7, 2008
Russel On First Causes: A Cause for Correction
The classic and I think most formidable argument for God’s existence is the argument from first Cause. Bertrand Russell would describe it otherwise: groundless and fallacious (link to article). He tells us how the argument goes, and how it goes wrong. “Everything we see in this world has a cause, and as you go back in the chain of causes further and further you must come to a First Cause, and to that First Cause you give the name of God.” This regression, which is the engine of the argument, is also its demise—if everything needs a cause, then so does God. But, “if there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the world as God, so that there cannot be any validity in that argument.” And so the first cause argument goes wrong.
But I think the real, or at least the first, error lies in Russell’s construal of the argument. There’s two schools of the cosmological (first cause) argument—the Kalam and the falsafa. The former seeks a cause for the beginning of the universe, the second, a cause for its sheer (non-necessary) existence. When you conflate these two, like Russell has done, you get fallacy. You end up saying everything needs a (external) cause (a part of the contingency argument’s first premise), but in the next breath, when you have come to God, that there is something which doesn’t need a (external) cause (an admission of the Kalam cosmological argument). But does that mean the cosmological argument is itself flawed?
Russell says, “[the] argument, I suppose, does not carry very much weight nowadays, because, in the first place, cause is not quite what it used to be.” Ironically, it is the proper conception of causality that secures the validity of the argument.
The Kalam argument does not hold that everything has a cause. It holds only that those things that have a beginning have a cause for their beginning. The question, “Who made God” is properly dismissed by answering “no one.” The Kalam argument only holds that beginning things, such as the universe, need causes, not beginningless things such as God. Russell himself agrees!—“the idea that things must have a beginning is really due to the poverty of our imagination.” But if God can be without beginning (“cause”), why not quit early and say the universe is beginningless? “If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God…” But is the universe really an equal substitute for God in matters of eternal existence? In a bout of redundancy, Russell states there is no “reason why [the world] should not have always existed,” and “no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning at all.” And even if it did begin, “there is no reason why the world could not have come into being without a cause.”
But if saying “there are no reasons for ____” demolishes an argument, let me be the first to say—“there is reason.” And so, I have re-established the cosmological argument.
But I think the real, or at least the first, error lies in Russell’s construal of the argument. There’s two schools of the cosmological (first cause) argument—the Kalam and the falsafa. The former seeks a cause for the beginning of the universe, the second, a cause for its sheer (non-necessary) existence. When you conflate these two, like Russell has done, you get fallacy. You end up saying everything needs a (external) cause (a part of the contingency argument’s first premise), but in the next breath, when you have come to God, that there is something which doesn’t need a (external) cause (an admission of the Kalam cosmological argument). But does that mean the cosmological argument is itself flawed?
Russell says, “[the] argument, I suppose, does not carry very much weight nowadays, because, in the first place, cause is not quite what it used to be.” Ironically, it is the proper conception of causality that secures the validity of the argument.
The Kalam argument does not hold that everything has a cause. It holds only that those things that have a beginning have a cause for their beginning. The question, “Who made God” is properly dismissed by answering “no one.” The Kalam argument only holds that beginning things, such as the universe, need causes, not beginningless things such as God. Russell himself agrees!—“the idea that things must have a beginning is really due to the poverty of our imagination.” But if God can be without beginning (“cause”), why not quit early and say the universe is beginningless? “If there can be anything without a cause, it may just as well be the
world as God…” But is the universe really an equal substitute for God in matters of eternal existence? In a bout of redundancy, Russell states there is no “reason why [the world] should not have always existed,” and “no reason to suppose that the world had a beginning at all.” And even if it did begin, “there is no reason why the world could not have come into being without a cause.”
But if saying “there are no reasons for ____” demolishes an argument, let me be the first to say—“there is reason.” And so, I have re-established the cosmological argument.
Why I Am Not an Atheist: Bertrand Russell Considered
Bertrand Russel sets out to explain why he is not a Christian (Link to article). His strategy (in part): to refute the theistic argument.
His refutation of “The natural Law argument” is interesting. The argument, as I understand it, begins by asking, “Why does nature behave as it does?” The theist gives an initial answer: because nature is governed by law. Why is it governed by law? For the theist, the correct answer is his own--God. Both answers are unacceptable for Russell. First, who is to say that nature behaves according to law? What is law anyway? Its the inherently necessitated mode of behavior of something. But for Russell, “We now find that a great many things we thought were natural laws are really human conventions.” The behavior isn’t really ordered or necessitated to a certain way; our minds imposed an order, "a convention," on it. And fundamentally, at the atomic level, nature is irregular, tell tale sign of chance: “Where you can get down to any knowledge of what atoms actually do, you will find they are much less subject to law than people thought, and that the laws at which you arrive are statistical averages of just the sort that would emerge from chance.” If there is no order, there is no need for One to do the ordering. Even if there natural laws, they don’t imply a divine law giver. Such an inference, according to Russell, falls to a dilemma: either God has no reason for ordering nature the way he did, or he is bound by what reason there was and thus he is useless as a law-explainer. Either you end up fundamentally without law or with unexplained law.
So goes the rebuttal. Now it’s my turn.
The second point first. I don’t feel the prick of this dilemma’s horns. What would be so bad about having law stop at some point, say, for why God ordered nature the way he did? This pains only given the auxilary hypothesis that nothing in nature can be exempt from law/ordered behavior. The theist never holds that all of nature must be subject to laws, but that those parts which are so subject require explanation, which only God provides. On the other horn, Russel assumes that if God has a reson, then he is obligated by that reason. So, if I have a reason for not burrning Russel's article, I abstain from burning it only under compulsion? And, what would be so bad about having God give according to some law? Certainly not the reason Russell gives! He holds that if one gives a proximate explanation for a law, without explaining how law relates to that explanation, they have done nothing. This is fundamentally the same as “who designed the designer?” rebuttal to the design argument. But what we are confronting is the behavior (or design) of the world , and it needs to be explained. Simply because I don’t explain my explanation does not mean I have not explained something! Are proximate explanation not proximate because they are not ultimate?! Besides, sometimes explanations come to a stop, and that’s OK (see Alvin Plantinga). In fact, if they did not, you’d get an infinite regress (See William L Craig).
On to the first point. First, i believe it is in doubt that the behavior of atoms is characterized by chance. Perhaps by probability, by then why are the probabilities the way they are? In either case (chance or probability), we have not discovered the cause. We have posited mystery— X happens (perhaps with a certain regularity), and something else could have happened, but we aren’t sure why it didn’t. And yet this, chance, is a better explanation than God? By no means am I taking offense at someone arguing against the explanatory power of theism. I am simply shocked that someone is saying that chance, which posits no known cause, is a better explanation. Saying, “I don’t know what caused it” is today more rational than saying “Someone caused it.” A curious place to arrive indeed.
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